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 Abstract 
Forming Railtrack was a key part of the privatisation of British Rail (BR).  
Railtrack took over ownership of BR’s fixed infrastructure in April 1994 and 
its parent company, the Railtrack Group, was floated in May 1996 on the 
London Stock Exchange. Despite the group posting some excellent financial 
results in the early years, Railtrack’s record on infrastructure improvement 
and safety was frequently criticised. This apparent inconsistency between 
shareholder interests and public service obligations culminated in Railtrack 
being placed in administration in October 2001. In view of this apparent 
inconsistency the reaction of the stock market to 19 key events is modelled.  
Among other things, we find when Railtrack announced after the Hatfield 
crash that there would be a six month programme of emergency track repairs, 
the group’s share price was marked down but it did not plummet. Even though 
Railtrack was in panic mode, it appears that investors decided to hold on to 
their shares, believing that the panic would have no long term repercussions.  
This proved to be a huge error of judgement. 
 
JEL Classification: G14; L33; L51; L92 
Key words: British Rail; Privatisation; Market Model; Robust Regression; 
Abnormal Return 
 
Acknowledgements 
The author would like to thank Tidings Ndhlovu and Ken Clark for arranging 
access to the Datastream facility at the University of Manchester, and Kevin 
Albertson for constructive comments on an earlier version of this paper.  PhD 
supervision by Chris Nash and Jeremy Toner is also acknowledged. The views 
expressed in this paper, however, are entirely my own and I take full 
responsibility for any errors and omissions.  
 
Address for Correspondence 
Dr Anthony Glass, Department of Economics, Manchester Metropolitan 
University, Mabel Tylecote Building, Cavendish Street, Manchester M15 
6BG 
e-mail: a.glass@mmu.ac.uk 
tel:  +44 161 247 3887  fax:  +44 161 247 6302
 1
1. Background 
 The implementation of the 1993 Railways Act involved privatising British 
Rail (BR) by vertically separating ownership and control of the fixed infrastructure 
from operations. Among other things, this involved forming an infrastructure 
authority, Railtrack. On 1 April 1994, ownership and control of the fixed 
infrastructure (track, signals, depots and stations) was transferred from BR to 
Railtrack (a separate government owned company). Upon the transfer of the 
infrastructure, Railtrack became responsible for: (i) providing train operators with 
access to the track; (ii) organising the maintenance and renewal of the infrastructure;
1
 
(iii) investment in the infrastructure; (iv) timetabling all of the services; (v) managing 
signalling across the network; and (v) monitoring track safety. Another facet of the 
implementation of the 1993 Railways Act involved setting up the Office of the Rail 
Regulator (ORR). The Rail Regulator is independent of the government and is 
primarily concerned with preventing the infrastructure authority from abusing its 
position as the monopoly supplier of fixed infrastructure. For example, the Rail 
Regulator has always been responsible for setting the rate of return that the 
infrastructure authority may earn from the access charges it levies on rail operators.  
 
 As Welsby and Nichols (1999) note, prior to the 1993 Railways Act and in 
the early stages of its implementation, there were no plans to privatise Railtrack. This 
was because Railtrack was a difficult candidate for privatisation (Wolmar, 2005, page 
79), as its assets were difficult to value, having been built up over 170 years with 
many of them already written off. Also, unlike the public utilities that were privatised 
                                                 
1
 The privatisation of BR involved, among other things, maintenance and renewal of the track being 
contracted out. In January 2003, Railtrack’s successor, Network Rail, announced that maintenance in  
three areas would be brought in-house when the existing contracts expired (Wolmar, 2005, page 209). 
In October 2003, it was announced that maintenance in the remaining four areas would also be 
integrated into Network Rail. 
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in the 1980s and early 1990s, Railtrack was heavily reliant on public subsidy. In the 
summer of 1994, however, the government decided Railtrack should be privatised as 
soon as possible, when a less ambitious schedule would have been more sensible 
(Bartle, 2003, page 51). On 20 May 1996, all the shares in the Railtrack Group, 
whose main operating subsidiary was Railtrack, were sold by way of a fixed price 
public offer. The group was floated on the London Stock Exchange at 390p per share 
which equated to a market valuation of £1.95bn. Following the write-off of £869m of 
Railtrack’s debt to the government resulting in a new debt of £586m, total sale 
proceeds were £2.49bn.
2
  
 
 The initial offer of shares in the Railtrack Group was ten times 
oversubscribed which may suggest that the group was underpriced. Florio and 
Manzoni (2004) provide evidence to support this view. Using the percentage change 
in the offer price at the close of trading on the first day as their measure of 
underpricing, they find that the initial offer of shares in the Railtrack Group was 
underpriced by 8 per cent. This was below the average of 13 per cent for their sample 
of 55 British firms privatised over the period 1977-1996 and was well short of the 
levels reported for a number of the early government sell-offs. For example: the sale 
of the first tranche of shares in British Telecom in December 1984 (underpriced by 
32 per cent); the sale of all the shares in British Airways in February 1987 
(underpriced by 35 per cent); and the sale of all the shares in Rolls Royce in May 
1987 (underpriced by 36 per cent). Underpricing of shares in British public utilities 
                                                 
2
 Prior to privatisation Railtrack owed the public sector £1.5bn most of which was owed to the 
National Loans Fund. This would not have been allowed to continue following privatisation because 
the fund and other public sector lenders are not permitted to lend to private sector companies. The 
government therefore decided to write-off a large portion of the debt leaving a new debt of £586m. 
Most of this new debt was paid off shortly after flotation and the remainder was sold by the 
government in July 1996.  
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and lax regulation of market power in the early years following privatisation were the 
reasons given by the Labour government in the 1997 Budget for imposing a one-off 
tax on the past profits of over 30 such companies, one of which was the Railtrack 
Group.
3
 The so-called windfall tax levied on the Railtrack Group was £156m and was 
provided for in the profit and loss account for the year ended 31 March 1998 
(Railtrack Group PLC, 1998).  
 
 The initial public offer of shares in the group was underpriced to ensure that 
there was enough demand for the shares and possibly also to deepen share ownership, 
which is where people who already own shares add a further stock to their portfolios. 
The shares were not underpriced to widen share ownership because it was recognised 
that Railtrack was towards the end of a long series of government share offers so 
there was limited opportunity to attract new investors. Also, unlike a lot of earlier 
government offers, there was a great deal of negative publicity surrounding the 
privatisation of BR. If there had been insufficient demand for shares in the Railtrack 
Group the sale would have failed, which would have threatened the entire rail 
privatisation scheme. The National Audit Office (NAO) have since suggested that the 
government could have raised much more from the sale of Railtrack Group if the 
offer had been postponed until autumn 1996 to allow the market more time to get a 
better understanding of the restructured rail industry, and/or by selling the shares in 
stages (NAO, 1998). The NAO estimate a further £1.5bn could have been raised with 
a well structured phased sale of shares. 
 
                                                 
3
 The tax retrospectively clawed back some of the windfall gains enjoyed by the companies’ 
shareholders and raised a total of £5.2bn in two stages. £3.5bn was used to finance the welfare-to-work 
scheme which helped the young and the long-term unemployed into employment. 
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 The railways in other countries such as Sweden, Germany and Argentina 
have been privatised by vertically separating ownership and control of the 
infrastructure from operations. Great Britain, however, is the only case where the 
state did not retain ownership and control of the fixed infrastructure.
4
 It was no 
coincidence either that in Great Britain the infrastructure authority experienced 
financial difficulties. As the then chief executive of Railtrack, Gerald Corbett, 
candidly put it:    
 
‘There is a tension between shareholder interests and public service 
obligations. The only way we can make profits is by not doing the 
things that we should do to make the railways better’.
5
 
 
 This tension was at the heart of the group’s turbulent experience on the stock 
market. In the early years following privatisation, the group posted some excellent 
financial results and was the darling of the stock market; its share price peaking at 
1768p on 23 November 1998 valuing the company at £8.97bn. The group reported 
end of year pre-tax profit of £346m, £388m and £428m for 1996/97, 1997/98 and 
1998/99, respectively (Railtrack Group PLC, 1997; 1998; 1999). But these results did 
not quell criticism of Railtrack’s record on infrastructure improvement and safety. 
Intense criticism of Railtrack’s record on safety by, among others, the journalist 
Christian Wolmar (2001, page 249) and former BR safety officer Stanley Hall (2003, 
page 120) may have been unfair because, using annual data from 1967-2003, Evans 
(2007) finds no statistical evidence to suggest that there was a deterioration in rail 
                                                 
4
 We do not carry out an assessment of rail privatisation in various countries here, the reader is instead 
directed to Shires et al (1994) for a review of seven cases of rail privatisation including those countries 
where there has been vertical separation of the infrastructure from operations. For a more detailed 
commentary on rail privatisation in Great Britain see Kain (1998), and Welsby and Nichols (1999). 
5
 Interview on the Today programme on BBC Radio 4, 17 December 1999. 
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safety following the privatisation of BR. On the other hand, it could be argued the 
criticism is justified in light of the letter which the Rail Regulator sent to Gerald 
Corbett in November 1999 to express concern about the increase in the number of 
broken rails on the network. In July 1999 there were 937 broken rails, 337 more than 
Railtrack predicted there would be. There was no appreciable reduction in the number 
of broken rails by August 2000, so the Rail Regulator announced that independent 
consultants would be appointed to assess Railtrack’s efforts.            
 
 In October 2000, a high speed GNER (Great North Eastern Railway) service 
from London Kings Cross to Leeds derailed near the Hertfordshire town of Hatfield, 
killing four people and injuring more than 70 others, four of whom were seriously 
injured. There was a lot of speculation in the media that the accident could have been 
caused by a broken rail which should have been replaced. The Health and Safety 
Commission (HSC) directed the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) to investigate the 
accident but it was not until the HSE published its second interim statement on the 
crash in January 2001 that it was confirmed the crash was in fact caused by a broken 
rail which should have been renewed (HSE, 2001).  
 
 The Hatfield derailment clearly raised serious concerns at Railtrack about 
the condition of the track because hundreds of speed restrictions were imposed across 
the network whilst a large number of sections of track were inspected. The track 
inspections revealed that the track was in a worse state than Railtrack had thought. 
Thus, the emergency track repairs and the compensation to operators for the 
disruption to services was more costly than was anticipated. Railtrack was therefore 
forced to approach the Rail Regulator for a £1.5bn advance of public support which it 
 6
was set to receive over the period 2006-2011. Shortly after Railtrack received the first 
instalment of the £1.5bn advance, the group revealed that it would pay a final 
dividend totalling £88.5m even though it had made its first full-year pre-tax loss of 
£534m (Railtrack Group PLC, 2001).
6
 This once again brought to the attention of the 
government the tension between shareholder interests and public service obligations.  
 
 On 1 October 2001, the government withdrew its support by withholding 
£162m that Railtrack had understood to be guaranteed as part of the £1.5bn advance. 
The government was of the opinion this rendered Railtrack insolvent and applied to 
the High Court to have the company placed in administration. Sitting in an 
emergency session on 7 October 2001 the judge concluded that Railtrack was indeed 
insolvent, and placed the company in administration. Trading in the group’s stock 
was suspended with its share price having plummeted to 280p, equating to a market 
valuation of just £1.45bn. Wolmar (2005, page 196) argues, however, that Railtrack 
was only deemed to be insolvent because senior executives at the company opted to 
concur with the government’s view, rather than try to increase the company’s income 
by applying to the Rail Regulator for an interim review of its access charges.   
 
 Railtrack remained in administration for around a year as the government 
had no clear idea about its successor (Wolmar, 2005, page 212). Eventually the 
government decided to set up Network Rail to purchase the infrastructure from 
Railtrack. The model on which Network Rail is based was proposed by Grayling 
(2001). It is very different from Railtrack in that it is a not-for-profit commercial 
                                                 
6
 The loss was largely because the bill for the emergency track repairs and compensation stood at 
£644m, and was set to continue rising. In November 2000, which was before Railtrack had carried out 
a thorough assessment of the condition of the track, the company predicted that the bill for the track 
repairs and compensation would be £250m.  
 7
company which is limited by guarantee with around 100 stakeholder members as 
opposed to shareholders. On 3 October 2002, Network Rail purchased the 
infrastructure from Railtrack for £500m and took responsibility for its £7.1bn of 
debt.
7
  
 
 Initially, the government did not offer any compensation to shareholders 
when Railtrack was placed in administration. Two shareholder action groups were 
then formed to campaign for compensation. The first group consisted of around 
49,000 small private investors and the second group was made up of institutional 
investors. When Railtrack went into administration £370m which belonged to the 
parent group was frozen. The government responded to the creation of the two action 
groups by offering to distribute the £370m, which equated to compensation of 70p 
per share. Both groups rejected the offer and brought separate claims against the 
government for increased compensation. The government then increased its offer by 
using a combination of tax revenue and £400m raised from the sale of the concession 
of the right to operate the first phase of the Channel Tunnel rail link from Folkestone 
to north Kent, which at the time was still under construction. The increased offer of 
250p per share was sufficient to persuade the institutional group to drop its claim. 
The group of private investors, however, continued with their claim for a further 
650p per share.
8
 Their claim, which was heard at the High Court in July 2005, was 
                                                 
7
 By taking over Railtrack, Network Rail became culpable for the charges brought against the former in 
relation to the Hatfield derailment. Network Rail was charged with manslaughter due to gross 
negligence, and also faced charges relating to health and safety offences. Six men and the company 
that was responsible for maintenance at the site, Balfour Beatty Rail Maintenance, faced the same 
charges. The charges against the six men were upheld as were the manslaughter charges against 
Railtrack and Balfour Beatty. Railtrack and Balfour Beatty were found guilty of health and safety 
offences. Network Rail was fined £3.5m and Balfour Beatty was fined £10m, but this was reduced to 
£7.5m on appeal. During the trial it was uncovered that a fault with the track at the site had been 
discovered some 21 months prior to the accident and for 6 months a new rail had been lying beside the 
defective section of track waiting to be installed (Wolmar, 2005, page 157). 
8
 900p being the average share price for the previous three years. 
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thrown out because they did not show that the then Secretary of State for Transport, 
Stephen Byers, had maliciously and actively sought Railtrack’s bankruptcy.   
 
 In view of the Railtrack Group’s turbulent experience on the stock market an 
event study methodology is used to quantify the reaction of the stock market to a 
number of key events. Underpinning event studies is the assumption of semi-strong 
capital market efficiency (Fama, 1965), which posits that share prices respond 
immediately to any price sensitive news. To determine how much better/worse than 
expectations each event was for investors we calculate post event abnormal returns, 
where an abnormal return is the difference between the actual post event return and 
the expected return in the absence of the event. All the post event abnormal returns 
are calculated from an estimate of the market model, which relates the return from 
holding a particular security to the return from holding the market portfolio.  
 
 There are a number of examples of early US studies which analyse stock 
market reaction to regulatory announcements (for example, Schwert, 1981; Schipper 
and Thompson, 1983; Binder, 1985; Rose, 1985). More recently, there have been 
several UK studies which examine stock market reaction to various announcements 
by public utility regulators such as the Office of Electricity Regulation (OFFER) 
(Dnes et al., 1998; Robinson and Taylor, 1998; Dnes and Seaton, 1999a); the Office 
of Water Services (OFWAT) (Sawkins, 1996; Morana and Sawkins, 2000; 2002); 
and the Office of Telecommunications (OFTEL) (Dnes and Seaton, 1999b). 
Following the above studies, we examine stock market reaction to a number of 
announcements by the ORR. But in order to capture fully the various different types 
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of event which affected the Railtrack Group, we also analyse the stock market 
reaction to a number of non-regulatory events.    
 
 The layout of the remainder of this paper is as follows. In section 2, the 19 
key events that have been selected are described. The data and methodology that are 
used in the empirical analysis are discussed in section 3. In section 4, the results from 
the econometric models are presented and analysed. Section 5 concludes with a 
summary of the main findings and a brief comment about a worthwhile area for 
further work.  
 
2. The Key Events 
 The archives of the Financial Times from the flotation of the Railtrack 
Group (20 May 1996) to the last day of trading before Railtrack entered 
administration (5 October 2001) are used to select a number of key events to analyse. 
A number of events are ruled out because there is not a sufficient number of data 
points prior to the event to undertake the statistical analysis (for example, the Rail 
Regulator instructed Railtrack to speed up investment in the infrastructure, which was 
reported in the Financial Times on 17 January 1997). Other events are not selected 
because another event occurred on the same day or soon after making it impossible to 
disentangle the reaction to each event in isolation (for example, Railtrack’s admission 
that planned investment in the infrastructure for the next ten years would be 
insufficient because rail travel was set to grow faster than it had predicted was 
reported in the Financial Times on 5 November 1999, as were details of the Railtrack 
Group’s interim results). In all a manageable 19 events are selected for analysis.  
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 A brief summary of the selected events and the date of each is provided in 
table 1. A more detailed description of the events is available from the author on 
request. It should be noted, the brief summary of each event and the detailed 
description are based on the information available on the day of the event as provided 
in the relevant article(s) in the Financial Times and, where the event is of a regulatory 
nature, in the relevant ORR publication.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
 The data which is used to estimate the market models consists of: the daily 
adjusted closing share price for the Railtrack Group; the daily cash dividend payment 
per share in the Railtrack Group; and the daily FTSE All-Share Index at the close of 
trading. All the data was extracted from Datastream so the necessary adjustments for 
various capital changes (share buy-backs, share splits, rights issues and stock 
dividends) were made prior to the analysis. The raw data, however, included bank 
holidays so these observations were excluded. The closing share price for the 
Railtrack Group from flotation to the suspension of trading in the group’s shares is 
presented in figure 1. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
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 As indicated by figure 2, we calculate 255 daily returns for the Railtrack 
Group which are denoted as Ri in equation 1. From equation 2 we obtain the 
corresponding number of daily returns for the market portfolio.
10
  
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
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where iR  is the daily return per share in the Railtrack Group on day i; iD  is the cash 
dividend per share in the Railtrack Group on day i; iP  and 1-iP  are the closing share 
prices for the Railtrack Group on days i and i-1, respectively; iM  is the market 
return on day i; and iFTSE  and 1−iFTSE  are the FTSE All-Share indices at the close 
of trading on days i and i-1, respectively. The FTSE All-Share Index is a better 
measure of market performance than the FTSE 100 Index because the former 
accounts for approximately 99 per cent of the capital value of all qualifying UK 
companies. Inspection of the daily volume of shares in the Railtrack Group that were 
traded between flotation and suspension indicates that there are no thin trading issues 
which we need account for in the modelling. This is not surprising because for the 
majority of the period between flotation and suspension, the Railtrack Group was in 
the FTSE 100. Specifically, the Railtrack Group entered the FTSE 100 on 18/07/96 
and remained there until 18/07/01. 
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 The date for each event in table 1 corresponds to Day 251 in figure 2.  
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 In terms of the above time line, daily returns for 250 days prior to an event 
are used to estimate the following market model using both OLS and robust 
estimators:
11
  
 
sss M+R εβα + =      (3) 
where sR  is the daily return per share in the Railtrack Group on day s and sM  is the 
market return on day s. The robust estimators which we use are as follows: Least 
Absolute Error; Gastwirth (1966); Five-quantile (Judge et al., 1988); Trimean 
(Tukey, 1970); and Trimmed Least Squares (Ruppert and Carroll, 1980). When the 
market model is estimated using OLS the residuals are usually characterised by non-
normality. This is usually because there is excess kurtosis in the residuals (the 
distribution of the residuals has fatter tails than the normal distribution). When this is 
the case, instead of using OLS a robust estimator should be used (Chan and 
Lakonishik, 1992; Mills et al., 1996; Cable and Holland, 1999) because irrespective 
of the distribution of the residuals robust estimators are reasonably efficient. 
 
 The OLS estimator minimises the sum of the squared residuals and therefore 
attaches a relatively heavy weight to outliers. This will increase the possibility of a 
distribution of residuals which has fat tails. In contrast, robust regression techniques 
are a special form of Weighted Least Squares and attach a smaller weight to outliers. 
Formally, robust regression estimators minimise the following function: 
 
)(∑
1
S
s
s
=
εψθ      (4) 
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 All the estimates of the market model reported in this paper are obtained using SHAZAM version 10 
(Whistler et al., 2004) 
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where for 0<θ<1: 
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 When θ = 0.5 we obtain the Least Absolute Error estimator. If the value of θ 
is larger (smaller) than 0.5, a bigger penalty is attached to large positive (negative) 
residuals. By varying θ between 0 and 1 we obtain a set of regression quantile 
estimators, ),(=)(
∧∧∧
βαθρ . We can see from equations 5, 6 and 7 that the general form 
of the Gastwirth, 
Gast
∧
ρ , Five-quantile, 
quant-Five
∧
ρ , and Trimean, 
Trimean
∧
ρ , 
estimators are very similar: 
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∧
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The general form of the Trimmed Least Squares estimator, 
Trimmed
∧
ρ , is as follows:  
 
∫ -1  ∧Trimmed∧ d )( -11 γγ θθργρ =     (8) 
where 0<γ<0.5. This technique involves calculating )(
∧
γρ  and )1(
∧
γρ − , and 
excluding all observations that lie on or below the γ-th regression quantile and all 
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those that lie on or above the (1-γ)-th quantile. The remaining observations are used 
to run an OLS regression.
12
 
 
Without wanting to say too much about the findings of the empirical analysis 
at this stage, in general, it turns out that all five robust specifications of the market 
model for each event do not perform well when subjected to the Jarque-Bera test for 
non-normal residuals. It is argued in due course though that a robust estimate of the 
market model which is characterised by non-normal residuals is not a great cause for 
concern. Generally, the Trimean estimate outperforms the other robust specifications 
when the Jarque-Bera test is carried out. For this reason, further in the paper we draw 
on the Trimean estimates to proceed with the analysis.  
 
 Once the robust estimate of the market model has been obtained the 
parameters are used to calculate daily abnormal returns for the test period. We follow 
Cox and Portes (1998) and use a five-day test period:   
 
ttt MRAR
∧∧
-- βα=      (9) 
where tAR  is the abnormal return on day t in the test period; tR  is the actual return 
per share in the Railtrack Group on day t in the test period; and tM  is the market 
return on day t in the test period. If the regression residuals are normally distributed 
the following test statistic, which is due to Patell (1976), can be used to perform a 
                                                 
12
 When applying the Trimmed Least Squares technique we follow Mills et al. (1996) and employ two 
specifications of the estimator, one with a trimming proportion of θ=0.1 and one where θ=0.2. 
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one-tailed test to establish if we may reject the null hypothesis of a zero standardised 
abnormal return (SAR):
13
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Φσ
AR
     (10) 
where: 
τ is used to denote the t-distribution;  
2-
∑
1
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S
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==σ  is the standard deviation of the abnormal returns over the 
estimation period;  
2
1
2
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=
++=  is the adjustment for the increase in the variance 
of the abnormal returns because of prediction outside the estimation period; 
and ∑
1
1
S
s
ss M
S
M
=
=  is the mean market return.  
Specifically, if the residuals are normally distributed then the test statistic follows a t-
distribution with S-2 degrees of freedom. We standardise the abnormal returns 
because an abnormal return is a prediction error and it has been known for some time 
that the variance of prediction errors is larger than the variance of regression residuals 
(Theil, 1971, pages 122-123). This is because prediction errors depend not just on the 
disturbance variance but also the estimation error in the parameters.   
 
                                                 
13
 Throughout this study we follow Dnes and Seaton (1999a) and perform one-tailed tests. 
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 To capture the entire reaction to an event, a cumulative standardised 
abnormal return (SCAR) is calculated by aggregating the SARs across the five-day 
test period. If the residuals are normally distributed, the test statistic below, which is 
again due to Patell (1976), follows a t-distribution with S-2 degrees of freedom and 
can be used to perform a one-tailed test of the null hypothesis that the SCAR is 
zero:
14
 
 
2-
1
∧  ~
1 ∑ ST
t
t τ
Φ
AR
T = σ
     (11) 
 It has been noted above that in general the five specifications of the market 
model for each event do not perform well when they are subjected to the Jarque-Bera 
test for non-normal residuals, but this is not a cause for concern. Even though 
rejection of the null of normal residuals implies we should exercise caution when 
making statistical inferences, as robust estimators are asymptotically normally 
distributed and the sample size is large, it is not unreasonable to assume that a 
regression coefficient/abnormal return is significant if the associated test statistic is 
large.  
 
 Moreover, abnormal returns are dependent over time because any two 
abnormal returns that are calculated from the same sample will be a function of the 
same parameter estimates. In line with most event studies we use test statistics which 
do not adjust for this dependence. This is because assuming that abnormal returns are 
serially independent is not a great cause for concern when the test period is short 
relative to the length of the estimation period (Cowan, 1993). For estimation and test 
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 The Patell test statistics originate from the accounting literature and were introduced to economics 
by Dodd and Warner (1983). 
 17
periods of varying lengths, Cowan calculates two test statistics for mean abnormal 
returns across a large number of securities. The first test statistic includes a correction 
for serial dependence and the second does not. In terms of the notation used in figure 
2, the relevant findings are as follows. When S=240 the uncorrected and corrected 
test statistics which relate to a daily abnormal return coincide. Other things being 
unchanged, the uncorrected test statistic which relates to the cumulative abnormal 
return becomes increasingly biased as T increases. To illustrate, when T=2, T=11 and 
T=100 the uncorrected test statistic exceeds the corrected one by 0.1 per cent, 1.9 per 
cent and 18.5 per cent, respectively, but only in the latter case is the difference 
significant.  
 
4. Results and Analysis 
 The OLS estimates of the market model are presented in table 2. Following 
Mills et al. (1996), the OLS estimates are the subject of four standard diagnostic tests: 
LM test for ARCH residuals; Ramsey RESET test; Box-Pierce-Ljung test for residual 
serial correlation; and Jarque-Bera test for non-normal residuals. In general, the OLS 
estimates yield residuals which are not characterised by ARCH. Only the estimate for 
Event 17 failed the test for ARCH residuals at the 5 per cent level. Moreover, the 
RESET test results suggest that the specification of the model is only a concern for 
seven events and there is only evidence to suggest that residual serial correlation is a 
problem for ten events. The results of these three tests on the OLS estimates are 
regarded as satisfactory, which is important because as we noted above robust 
regression techniques were intended only to address the problem of non-normal 
residuals. 
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[Table 2 about here]   
 
 As we expected when the Jarque-Bera test is performed on the OLS 
estimates there is widespread evidence of non-normal residuals. Specifically, for all 
19 events the null of normal residuals is rejected at the 5 per cent level. The issue, 
however, is whether using a robust regression estimator affected the non-normality of 
the residuals. When the Jarque-Bera test is performed on all six robust specifications 
for each event, with the exception of the Gastwirth estimate for Event 3, the null is 
rejected at the 5 per cent level.
15
 Hence, in general, for each event the distribution of 
the test statistics for: (i) the regression coefficients; (ii) the SARs; and (iii) the SCAR 
will not be known in a finite sample. This is not a cause for concern because as the 
sample size is large, we can draw on the fact that the robust estimators which we use 
in this study are asymptotically normally distributed. Thus, it is not unreasonable to 
conclude that a robust regression coefficient/abnormal return is significant if the 
associated test statistic is greater than any reasonable critical value. To calculate the 
abnormal returns we use the Trimean estimates which are presented in table 3.
16
 This 
is because when the six robust specifications are subjected to the Jarque-Bera test, for 
17 of the events the Trimean estimate yields the lowest test statistic.
17
  
 
[Table 3 about here]   
 
                                                 
15
 In light of the findings of Cable and Holland (2000) it should not be surprising that robust estimates 
of the market model for a single security yield non-normal residuals. They conclude that an estimate of 
the market model is only likely to yield normal residuals if a robust regression technique is used in 
conjunction with average daily return data across at least 60 securities. 
16
 The other robust estimates of the market model are available from the author on request. 
17
 Moreover, the Box-Pierce-Ljung test results suggest that using a robust estimator has no impact on 
the serial correlation. Where OLS residuals are serially correlated this is also the case for robust 
residuals, irrespective of which robust estimator is used. 
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 Before we calculate the abnormal returns we note, compared to the 
corresponding OLS estimate when the Trimean technique is used, with the exception 
of Event 19, the constant decreases and in each case the associated test statistic 
increases, which is what we would expect when less weight is attached to outliers. A 
similar comparison of the OLS and Trimean coefficients on Ms is not so conclusive. 
When the Trimean technique is used the coefficient on Ms only decreases for 12 
events, but in every case the absolute value of the associated test statistic increases.
18
  
 
 The SARs and the SCAR for each event and the associated test statistics are 
presented in table 4. If the abnormal return is positive (negative) then the group’s 
stock has done better (worse) than was anticipated. Dnes et al. (1998) note that 
significant abnormal returns are not particularly common in event studies. We, 
however, obtain at least one SAR which is significant for all but four events (Event 4, 
Event 10, Event 11 and Event 15) which, to some degree, confirms that the Railtrack 
Group did indeed have a turbulent experience on the stock market.  
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
 It is remarkable there are no significant negative SARs for Event 15, as this 
event revealed the scale of the disruption to services as a result of the Hatfield 
derailment. Railtrack ‘panicked’  (Wolmar, 2005, page 156) after the Hatfield 
derailment and embarked on an extensive programme of emergency track repairs.
19
 
                                                 
18
 The coefficient on Ms for Event 3 is the only Trimean parameter which is not significant but this 
does not imply that the parameter is zero. Thus, ss MR 1323.0-0205.0 = is the estimate of the market 
model which is used to calculate the abnormal returns for Event 3. 
19
 The panic following the Hatfield derailment was because Railtrack did not have sufficient 
knowledge about the condition of the track. The Rail Regulator had been aware of this for some time 
and took steps to address the issue in November 1999. He proposed a modification of Railtrack’s 
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Negative SARs on test days one, three, four and five for Event 15 are observed which 
suggests that the group’s stock was marked down. Failure to observe significant 
negative SARs implies that although Railtrack appeared to be in panic mode the 
group’s share price did not go into freefall. It appears that investors held onto their 
shares, believing that the panic which had set in at Railtrack would not have any long-
term implications. This proved to be a serious error of judgement.  
 
 We can see from figure 1 that the group’s share price when into freefall in 
early 2001. It appeared the market finally recognised that the panic at Railtrack would 
have long-term repercussions. For example, it was reported in the Financial Times on 
16 January 2001 that the increased focus on safety following the Hatfield derailment 
combined with other funding problems had caused Railtrack’s debt to spiral. It was 
reported that the Rail Regulator might be prepared to sanction a £1bn advance of 
public support which the company was set to receive over the period 2006-2011, to 
ensure that expenditure on track maintenance and track replacement was not cut, and 
big enhancement projects such as second phase of the Channel Tunnel Rail Link were 
not put on hold. 
 
 Smith (2006) carried out a cost-benefit analysis of the two-year period of 
increased focus on safety following the Hatfield derailment. He found the annual 
reduction in passenger fatalities from 28 to 15.5 yielded an annual increase in social 
welfare of £42m. This was dwarfed by the annual increase in industry costs of 
£2.1bn. These figures suggest the cost of saving an additional life over the two-year 
                                                                                                                                           
network licence, which would require the company to establish and maintain an asset register to 
document the condition and capacity of its assets (ORR, 1999b). This change to Railtrack’s network 
licence came into force in April 2001 (ORR, 2001a). The asset register is now the responsibility of 
Network Rail.    
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period was £168m. It is apparent from a simple comparison of this figure with the 
value of a rail fatality for 2001/02 (£3.35m), as suggested by the Rail Safety and 
Standards Board, that Railtrack’s increased focus on safety after the Hatfield 
derailment was a gross overreaction. 
 
 For eight events only one significant SAR is reported (Event 5, Event 6, 
Event 7, Event 12, Event 13, Event 16, Event 17 and Event 19). The SARs for Event 
13, Event 16 and Event 19 are worthy of further discussion. We might have expected 
a significant negative SAR on test day one for Event 13. It seems, however, there was 
no knee-jerk reaction by the market on the day of the Hatfield derailment. We suggest 
therefore that investors took time to acquire information about the crash. As it became 
clearer that Railtrack might be to blame, there was a dramatic mark down of the 
group’s stock, hence the negative SAR on test day two. The absence of any 
significant SARs for the remainder of the test period suggests that the market did not 
speculate any further about the cause of such an important event. It appears instead 
that the market chose to postpone its response until the facts about the crash came to 
light. 
 
 The significant SAR on test day three for Event 16 is interesting because 
some additional news broke on this day. Only two working days after Railtrack’s 
finance director, Steven Marshall, had been promoted to replace Gerald Corbett, it 
was announced that the chairman of the shadow Strategic Rail Authority (sSRA), Sir 
Alistair Morton, had been asked by the government to carry out an emergency review 
of the company’s senior management. Although Morton denied he was considering 
recommending widespread restructuring of Railtrack, he did admit he might favour a 
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new chief executive and chairman. The market did not take kindly to the prospect of 
more upheaval in the boardroom, even though it could have been argued that 
Marshall lacked the necessary experience to spearhead the company’s revival in the 
wake of the Hatfield derailment, having only been in the rail industry for a short 
period.  
  
 Event 19 highlighted the tension between shareholder interests and public 
service obligations because having embarked on an extensive programme of 
emergency track repairs following the Hatfield derailment, the Railtrack Group 
announced that it would pay a final dividend of 17.15p per share totalling £88.5m, 
even though it had posted its first full-year pre-tax loss of £534m. With an interim 
dividend of 9.75p per share, the total dividend per share of 26.90p remained 
unchanged from the previous year. The board’s decision to pay a final dividend 
clearly appeased investors as we report no significant negative SARs.  
 
 A number of events yielded more than one significant SAR such as Event 1, 
Event 14 and Event 18. In the case of Event 1 it is clear the news was worse than the 
market anticipated because the significant SARs are negative. More specifically, 
Event 1 refers to the launch of the periodic review of Railtrack’s access charges. The 
Rail Regulator announced that he planned to undertake a wide-ranging review of 
Railtrack’s sources of profit. We may infer from this that the Rail Regulator planned 
to be much tougher in the future. Alternatively, it could be argued that significant 
negative SARs indicate that the market overreacted to the news. After all Event 1 
marked the beginning of a two-year review so there was plenty of time for the stance 
of the Rail Regulator to soften.  
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 The significant positive SARs on test days two and three for Event 14 
indicate that the news was better than investors expected. In contrast, we conclude 
from the significant negative SARs on test days two, three and four for Event 18 that 
the news was worse than anticipated. It is therefore suggested that investors began 
reacting to both events on test day two. For Event 14, we posit that the delay before 
the market reacted to the Rail Regulator’s final conclusions on the periodic review 
was because investors needed some time to carry out the necessary calculations. We 
note with reference to Event 18, however, that the news about the further increase in 
the cost of the west coast main line upgrade was widely anticipated. Thus, this news 
would have been capitalised before the event day. It is suggested therefore that there 
was a delay before investors reacted to Event 18 because they were reluctant to 
speculate about the conditions which the government would attach to the £1.5bn 
advance. Instead investors waited for these conditions to be confirmed on test day 
two. In exchange for the advance, the deputy prime minister revealed that Railtrack 
had agreed to appoint a government approved director of consumer and public 
interests. Furthermore, it was announced that Railtrack had lost its monopoly on big 
enhancement projects that were not already underway. 
 
 We also report a significant negative SAR on test day four for Event 14 and 
a significant positive SAR on test day five for Event 18. These significant SARs were 
both due to additional pieces of news. The former was because Railtrack revealed it 
had incorrectly announced that the Carlisle-Glasgow part of the west coast main line 
would be closed for several days for rail replacement work. It turned out that the track 
on this section of the line was in better condition than the company thought. Hence, 
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this section of the line did not remain closed for several days, which again highlights 
how ill-informed Railtrack was about the condition of the track. The latter was 
because it was anticipated Railtrack’s long-term freight revenue would increase. 
Specifically, the Strategic Rail Authority (SRA) revealed it had agreed to increase the 
public subsidy to Railtrack by £497m over the next five years to finance a 50 per cent 
cut in freight access charges, in an effort to promote an increase in freight movement 
by rail (ORR, 2001b).  
 
 Finally, we briefly discuss an alternative way of presenting the findings. This 
involves using the SARs in conjunction with the market valuation of the group to 
calculate the daily and cumulative wealth effects in table 5. A daily wealth effect is 
the daily change in the market value that can be attributed to the event, and the 
cumulative wealth effect is the sum of the daily effects across the five-day test period. 
The daily wealth effect is calculated by simply multiplying the market value at the 
close of trading on the previous day by the relevant SAR (for example, the daily 
wealth effect on test day 1 for Event 1 is the market value at the close of trading on 
Tuesday 9 December 1997, £5443.09m, multiplied by –0.0827). 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 In Great Britain the railways were privatised by vertically separating 
ownership and control of the infrastructure from operations. Other cases of rail 
privatisation where there has been vertical separation include Sweden, Germany and 
Argentina. In each of these three cases the state retained ownership and control of the 
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fixed infrastructure. In Great Britain, however, the parent company of the 
infrastructure authority was floated on the London Stock Exchange.  
 
 Here we analyse how the stock market reacted to key events involving 
Railtrack. Such a study is interesting as the Railtrack Group had a turbulent 
experience on the stock market which culminated in Railtrack being placed in 
administration and shareholders having to start legal proceedings to extract an offer of 
compensation from the government. At the outset the group was very much the 
darling of the stock market. This is evident as the group entered the FTSE 100 just 
over two months after flotation. There appeared to be, however, an inconsistency 
between the interests of shareholders and the group’s public service obligations, as its 
excellent financial performance in the early years was marred by criticism of its 
record on infrastructure improvement and safety.  
 
 Most surprising were the results for Event 15, which proved to be integral in 
the demise of Railtrack. When Railtrack revealed after the Hatfield crash that there 
would be a six month programme of emergency track repairs because the problem of 
broken rails was worse than the company thought, we might have expected a number 
of significant negative SARs. We report some negative SARs which indicates that the 
group’s stock was marked down, but none were significant. This suggests that 
although panic had set in at Railtrack, the group’s share price did not plummet. It 
appears that many investors held onto their shares, believing that the overreaction by 
Railtrack would have no long-term impact. This proved to be a huge error of 
judgement.  
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 The programme of repairs was completed within the six-month timescale 
that Railtrack set itself. The bill for the repairs and compensation to operators for 
service disruption, however, was well above Railtrack’s original prediction. In early 
2001 there was speculation that the post-Hatfield programme of repairs and the 
ensuing compensation could have some long-term implications, which sent the 
group’s share price into freefall. Specifically, it was revealed that the post-Hatfield 
safety measures combined with other funding problems had left a big hole in 
Railtrack’s finances and to prevent spending on maintenance and renewal of the track 
being cut, and/or work on big enhancement projects being put on hold, the Rail 
Regulator had indicated that he might be prepared to advance the company £1bn of 
public support that it was set to receive over the period 2006-2011. In April 2001, the 
Rail Regulator agreed to advance Railtrack £1.5bn of public support that it was set to 
receive over the next five-year regulatory period, thereby confirming the long-term 
repercussions of the Hatfield derailment.  
 
 Event 19 highlighted the inconsistency between the interests of investors vis-
à-vis the interests of rail users because just weeks after Railtrack had received the first 
instalment of the £1.5bn advance, the group announced that it would pay a final 
dividend totalling £88.5m even though it had made its first full-year pre-tax loss of 
£534m. The board’s decision to pay a final dividend clearly appeased investors 
because we report no significant negative SARs. A further instalment of the £1.5bn 
advance which was due to be paid on 1 October 2001 played a key role in Railtrack’s 
downfall. Railtrack was under impression that the £162m instalment was guaranteed 
but it was withheld by the Secretary of State for Transport, which ultimately led to 
company being declared insolvent.  
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 As a final point a worthwhile area for further work is proposed. In this study 
stock market reaction to a wide range of different types of event has been modelled. It 
would be worthwhile, however, to use share price data for the Railtrack Group to 
carry out a study which focuses solely on the reaction to announcements by the ORR. 
Such a study would complement work which has analysed the stock market reaction 
to announcements by UK public utility regulators. Moreover, in such a study a 
comparison could be made between the reaction to announcements by John Swift 
(Rail Regulator, December 1993-November 1998) and Tom Winsor (Rail Regulator, 
July 1999-July 2004). This would be interesting because it was widely felt that the 
regulation of Railtrack by John Swift was too lenient. Tom Winsor on the other hand 
was much tougher. After presiding over a number of regulatory reforms Winsor was 
of the opinion that rail regulation was ‘fit for purpose’ (Winsor, 2002), the suggestion 
being that there was regulatory failure in the earlier years.    
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Table 1: Brief Details of the Events  
EVENT 
NUMBER 
EVENT DATE BRIEF SUMMARY 
1 Wednesday 10 
December 1997 
The Rail Regulator launched the periodic review of Railtrack’s access charges by announcing that he 
intended to carry out a wide ranging review of the company’s sources of profit (ORR, 1997). 
2 Tuesday 2 June 
1998 
Railtrack rescued the troubled £5.4bn rail link connecting London with the Channel Tunnel by agreeing to 
purchase from the construction company, London and Continental Railways, phase 1 of the link upon its 
completion. 
3 Wednesday 9 
December 1998 
The Acting Rail Regulator unveiled plans to cap Railtrack’s profit for the next five-year regulatory period 
which was to begin in April 2001, because he felt the company was making excessive returns on routine 
track maintenance (ORR, 1998). 
4 Monday 1 
February 1999 
Railtrack announced that it plans to commit to riskier projects. 
5 Tuesday 5 
October 1999 
A high-speed Great Western service and a local Thames Trains service collided at Ladbroke Grove. 
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6 Friday 15 
October 1999 
Railtrack has provisionally committed to take over ownership of London Underground’s sub-surface lines 
for a period of ten years. 
7 Wednesday 1 
December 1999 
Railtrack has had its exclusive option on the 30-year ownership rights for London Underground’s sub-
surface lines withdrawn.  
8 Wednesday 14 
December 1999 
As the Rail Regulator was expected to provisionally conclude that the cap on Railtrack’s profit would be 
loosened for the next five-year regulatory period,
9
 the company announced that the cost of the upgrade of 
the west coast main line linking London and Glasgow had increased to £5.8bn, almost two and half times the 
original budget. 
9 Tuesday 21 
March 2000 
Railtrack learned that it would face a much tougher performance target with respect to reduced delays for 
2000/2001 than it had hoped for, but the fine for missing its 1999/2000 performance target would be around 
£10m and not £40m as had been suggested. 
10 Friday 14 April 
2000 
The key features of the Rail Regulator’s provisional conclusions on the periodic review of Railtrack’s access 
charges were some new incentives for the company, and a proposal which would make the company more 
accountable as it would be required to provide the Rail Regulator with detailed information (ORR, 2000a). 
                                                 
9
 These details are speculation about the Rail Regulator’s provisional conclusions on Railtrack’s revenue requirements (ORR, 1999a), which were published the following 
day and formed part of his periodic review of the company’s access charges. The source for these details was an article published in the Financial Times on Wednesday 14 
December 1999.    
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11 Tuesday 20 June 
2000 
The Rail Regulator announced that he planned to allow Railtrack to increase its access charges over the 
course of the next two five-year regulatory periods, to claim back nearly all of the overspend on track 
renewal on the west coast main line over this ten-year period (ORR, 2000b). 
12 Thursday 27 July 
2000 
The Rail Regulator revealed that he planned to significantly loosen the cap on Railtrack’s income for the 
next five-year regulatory period, and he also intended to monitor the company’s spending plans more closely  
(ORR, 2000c). 
13 Tuesday 17 
October 2000 
A high-speed GNER InterCity service from London Kings Cross to Leeds derailed near the Hertfordshire 
town of Hatfield with four people pronounced dead at the scene and further 30 seriously injured. 
14 Monday 23 
October 2000 
The Rail Regulator’s final conclusions on the periodic review of Railtrack’s access charges (ORR, 2000d) 
included a number of major departures from the policy proposed in earlier publications, and was regarded as 
an excellent outcome for the company. 
15 Thursday 2 
November 2000 
Railtrack revealed following the Hatfield derailment that there would be a six month programme of 
emergency track repairs.  
16 Friday 17 
November 2000 
Railtrack’s chief executive, Gerald Corbett, had his second offer to resign accepted by the company’s board 
of directors. 
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17 Thursday 15 
February 2001 
Railtrack admitted that the cost of the upgrade of the east coast main line linking London and Edinburgh had 
soared.  
18 Monday 2 April 
2001 
As the government was about to approve the advance of a £1.5bn subsidy which Railtrack would otherwise 
have received over the period 2006-2011, the company announced that the cost of the west coast main line 
upgrade had increased to £6.3bn. 
19 Thursday 24 
May 2001 
The Railtrack Group made its first full-year pre-tax loss of £534m, but still announced that it would pay a 
final dividend totalling £88.5m. 
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Table 2: OLS Estimates of the Market Model 
OLS MODEL EVENT 
α β 
1 0.0325* 
(29.06) 
0.8337* 
(5.88) 
2 0.0272* 
(20.90) 
0.9574* 
(6.42) 
3 0.0216* 
(14.90) 
-0.0994 
(-0.54) 
4 0.0202* 
(14.34) 
0.5024* 
(4.25) 
5 0.0177* 
(12.71) 
0.5184* 
(4.05) 
6 0.0171* 
(12.18) 
0.3977* 
(2.95) 
7 
 
0.0176* 
(12.48) 
0.4307* 
(3.05) 
8 0.0178* 
(12.96) 
0.4444* 
(3.21) 
9 0.0216* 
(12.31) 
5.038* 
(2.90) 
10 0.0253* 
(13.19) 
0.3808* 
(2.02) 
11 0.0277* 
(14.37) 
0.3441 
(1.96) 
12 0.0289* 0.3603* 
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(14.96) (2.00) 
13 0.0303* 
(16.04) 
0.3247 
(1.75) 
14 
 
0.0301* 
(15.73) 
0.3681 
(1.96) 
15 0.0305* 
(15.69) 
0.4663* 
(2.45) 
16 0.0311* 
(16.24) 
0.4636* 
(2.49) 
17 0.0318* 
(18.99) 
0.5218* 
(3.11) 
18 0.0294* 
(19.97) 
0.7520* 
(5.36) 
19 0.0304* 
(17.38) 
1.0179* 
(5.90) 
Notes: 
 Test statistics are in parentheses. 
 If we assume the residuals are normally distributed, the parameters denoted by a * are significant at the 
5 per cent level.  
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Table 3: Robust Estimates of the Market Model 
TRIMEAN MODEL EVENT 
α β 
1 0.0319* 
(55.82) 
0.8149* 
(11.24) 
2 0.0269* 
(40.44) 
0.9519* 
(12.47) 
3 0.0205* 
(23.92) 
-0.1323 
(-1.22) 
4 0.0188* 
(22.99) 
0.5875* 
(8.56) 
5 0.0167* 
(20.71) 
0.5630* 
(7.62) 
6 0.0158* 
(19.89) 
0.4611* 
(6.05) 
7 
 
0.0163* 
(20.70) 
0.5410* 
(6.85) 
8 0.0163* 
(20.77) 
0.5645* 
(7.13) 
9 0.0192* 
(19.12) 
0.4749* 
(4.76) 
10 0.0223* 
(20.91) 
0.4806* 
(4.61) 
11 0.0247* 
(22.15) 
0.3359* 
(3.30) 
12 0.0269* 0.3182* 
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(24.14) (3.06) 
13 0.0284* 
(27.09) 
0.2234* 
(2.17) 
14 
 
0.0282* 
(27.36) 
0.2054* 
(2.03) 
15 0.0287* 
(25.77) 
0.3046* 
(2.79) 
16 0.0291* 
(26.59) 
0.3109* 
(2.92) 
17 0.0305* 
(32.29) 
0.3116* 
(3.31) 
18 0.0282* 
(35.91) 
0.5816* 
(7.76) 
19 0.0312* 
(38.83) 
0.7800* 
(9.84) 
Notes: 
 Test statistics are in parentheses. 
 The sample size is large and the robust regression estimators used in this study are asymptotically 
normally distributed. In light of this, we conclude that the parameters denoted by a * are significant at 
the 5 per cent level.  
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Table 4: Abnormal Returns 
EVENT TEST 
DAY 1 
ABNORMAL 
RETURN 
TEST 
DAY 2 
ABNORMAL 
RETURN 
TEST 
DAY 3 
ABNORMAL 
RETURN 
TEST 
DAY 4 
ABNORMAL 
RETURN 
TEST 
DAY 5 
ABNORMAL 
RETURN 
5-DAY 
CUMULATIVE 
ABNORMAL 
RETURN 
1 -0.0827* 
(-4.69) 
-0.0503* 
(-2.83) 
0.0142 
(0.81) 
-0.0396* 
(-2.24) 
-0.0111 
(-0.63) 
-0.1696* 
(-4.29) 
2 0.0436* 
(2.13) 
0.0166 
(0.81) 
0.0525* 
(2.56) 
-0.0128 
(-0.62) 
-0.0108 
(-0.53) 
0.0892* 
(1.95) 
3 -0.0473* 
(-2.06) 
-0.0308 
(-1.34) 
-0.0119 
(-0.51) 
0.0903* 
(3.94) 
-0.0327 
(-1.43) 
-0.0324 
(-0.63) 
4 0.0263 
(1.17) 
-0.0201 
(-0.90) 
-0.0019 
(-0.09) 
0.0143 
(0.64) 
0.0043 
(0.19) 
0.0228 
(0.45) 
5 -0.0085 
(-0.38) 
-0.0351 
(-1.59) 
-0.0305 
(-1.38) 
0.0217 
(0.99) 
-0.0428* 
(-1.94) 
-0.0950* 
(-1.92) 
6 0.0471* 
(2.10) 
-0.0012 
(-0.05) 
0.0256 
(1.15) 
-0.0049 
(-0.22) 
-0.0043 
(-0.19) 
0.0625 
(1.24) 
7 -0.0580* 
(-2.60) 
-0.0154 
(-0.69) 
0.0004 
(0.02) 
-0.0132 
(-0.59) 
-0.0199 
(-0.89) 
-0.1062* 
(-2.13) 
8 0.0893* 
(4.10) 
0.1482* 
(6.79) 
0.0624* 
(2.87) 
0.0311 
(1.43) 
-0.0249 
(-1.14) 
0.3061* 
(6.28) 
9 0.0700* 
(2.52) 
0.1229* 
(4.42) 
0.0273 
(0.98) 
0.0328 
(1.17) 
0.0078 
(0.28) 
0.2609* 
(4.19) 
10 0.0508 
(1.64) 
-0.0496 
(-1.59) 
0.0408 
(1.33) 
0.0149 
(0.48) 
-0.0030 
(-0.10) 
0.0538 
(0.79) 
11 0.0016 0.0225 0.0009 -0.0130 0.0201 0.0321 
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(0.05) (0.73) (0.03) (-0.42) (0.65) (0.47) 
12 0.0096 
(0.31) 
0.0555* 
(1.81) 
0.0017 
(0.06) 
0.0073 
(0.24) 
0.0060 
(0.20) 
0.0802 
(1.17) 
13 0.0117 
(0.39) 
-0.0832* 
(-2.76) 
-0.0186 
(-0.62) 
0.0063 
(0.21) 
0.0289 
(0.96) 
-0.0550 
(-0.82) 
14 
 
0.0293 
(0.96) 
0.0515* 
(1.69) 
0.0665* 
(2.18) 
-0.0524* 
(-1.72) 
-0.0354 
(-1.16) 
0.0595 
(0.87) 
15 -0.0197 
(-0.64) 
0.0021 
(0.07) 
-0.0307 
(-0.99) 
-0.0145 
(-0.47) 
-0.0192 
(-0.62) 
-0.0820 
(-1.19) 
16 0.0184 
(0.60) 
-0.0374 
(-1.23) 
-0.0909* 
(-2.98) 
0.0498 
(1.64) 
-0.0005 
(-0.02) 
-0.0606 
(-0.89) 
17 -0.0214 
(-0.80) 
-0.0574* 
(-2.15) 
-0.0065 
(-0.24) 
-0.0039 
(-0.15) 
0.0087 
(0.32) 
-0.0805 
(-1.35) 
18 0.0313 
(1.34) 
-0.1575* 
(-6.74) 
-0.1232* 
(-5.21) 
-0.0436* 
(-1.86) 
0.0845* 
(3.60) 
-0.2086* 
(-3.97) 
19 0.0439 
(1.57) 
-0.0132 
(-0.47) 
-0.0358 
(-1.29) 
0.0275 
(0.99) 
0.0472* 
(1.69) 
0.0695 
(1.12) 
Notes: 
 Test statistics are in parentheses. 
 The sample size is large and the robust regression estimators used in this study are asymptotically normally distributed. 
In light of this, we conclude that the abnormal returns denoted by a * are significant at the 5 per cent level. 
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Table 5: Wealth Effects 
EVENT DAY 1 
WEALTH 
EFFECT (£ 
MILLIONS) 
DAY 2 
WEALTH 
EFFECT (£ 
MILLIONS) 
DAY 3 
WEALTH 
EFFECT (£ 
MILLIONS) 
DAY 4 
WEALTH 
EFFECT (£ 
MILLIONS) 
DAY 5 
WEALTH 
EFFECT (£ 
MILLIONS) 
5-DAY 
CUMULATIVE 
WEALTH 
EFFECT (£ 
MILLIONS) 
1 -450.29 -252.48 67.44 -192.71 -52.96 -925.00 
2 265.75 106.49 347.31 -89.15 -76.12 552.42 
3 -365.29 -227.53 -85.29 641.53 -253.94 -268.80 
4 205.09 -163.47 -15.48 113.80 34.96 176.98 
5 -57.67 -236.31 -197.73 137.46 -274.82 -618.69 
6 280.90 -7.22 155.79 -30.52 -26.29 385.79 
7 -286.08 -71.11 1.63 -58.62 -85.84 -506.59 
8 377.23 671.55 319.10 168.06 -137.73 1302.77 
9 216.62 396.59 96.95 116.99 28.48 816.49 
10 214.29 -215.24 163.86 61.96 -12.76 257.03 
11 7.29 107.99 4.41 -60.67 95.19 158.42 
12 47.43 287.30 8.76 38.29 31.65 416.16 
13 67.29 -439.72 -96.66 32.93 156.39 -275.73 
14 158.39 294.32 408.00 -305.64 -199.66 353.66 
15 -106.50 11.41 -162.09 -75.93 -99.06 -405.73 
16 97.52 -191.73 -422.86 243.05 -2.42 -291.82 
17 -111.50 -282.85 -31.53 -19.22 42.43 -397.62 
18 110.93 -463.25 -305.01 -100.89 207.08 -742.33 
19 307.64 -90.98 -245.94 189.32 316.60 517.21 
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Figure 1: Closing Share Price for the Railtrack Group from Flotation to Suspension (20/05/1996 to 05/10/2001) 
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Figure 2: Time Line for the Analysis of each Event 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Day 1              Day 250     Day 255  
Estimation Period, S Days=250,    Test Period, T Days=5, 
s=1,2,…,250      t=1,2,…,5 
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